This paper uses a multinomial framework to develop several takeover prediction models. The motivation for this approach lies with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), who note that separate considerations are appropriate for predicting which firms are subject to hostile (disciplinary) and friendly (synergistic) takeovers. In a typical binomial setting, in which takeover targets are treated as belonging to one homogenous group, differences between hostile and friendly targets are ignored. This may result in biased takeover probabilities and poor predictive performance. The results from this paper show that the multinomial models have higher significance and explanatory power. However, testing the models in an investment portfolio setting, the results suggest that neither approach beats a benchmark control portfolio of firms of a similar size.
Introduction
One well documented motive for developing takeover prediction models is to use the predictions from such models to provide the basis for an investment strategy in which firms with high estimated probabilities of takeover are invested in (e.g., Wansley, Roenfeldt and Cooley, 1983; and Palepu, 1986) . The takeover literature has shown that for a target firm, the share price increases substantially (in some cases by as much as 50 percent), from a period before the bid announcement date to the completion of the takeover (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983; and Franks and Harris, 1989) . If a model can be developed to predict in advance such takeovers, then holding a portfolio of predicted targets should result in the generation of abnormal returns. Naturally, however, the model's predictions will only be of use if it beats the market to the conclusion that a firm is a target.
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The possibility of profiting from takeover prediction has motivated many researchers to develop models using financial statement and market-based data. These studies include, for example, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) , Wansley et al. (1983) , Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1990) . Few studies, however, have actually empirically tested the ability of their models to provide a portfolio capable of generating abnormal returns. This is surprising since many of them report high prediction rates, in some cases ranging from 75 to 95 percent. Predictability, however, does not imply abnormal returns can be earned. In fact, if the takeover probabilities generated by a prediction model are also known to the market, and are properly incorporated into share prices, then predictability and zero abnormal returns are perfectly consistent.
Studies that have tested the ability of their models to generate abnormal returns provide mixed results. Wansley et al. (1983) provides evidence of significant and positive abnormal returns to a portfolio of 25 predicted targets. The portfolio abnormal returns of 17 percent over a holding period of 21 months are large and impressive, but the authors cast doubt on the robustness of this result due to their failure to adjust for a possible 'size effect' (Banz, 1981) in the portfolio returns. Palepu (1986) provided a ground clearing exercise in terms of correcting for methodological flaws ignored by previous prediction studies. After correcting for these methodological flaws his model was unable to identify a portfolio capable of generating positive abnormal returns. Palepu (1986, p. 30) concludes that 'this implies that the model's ability to predict takeover targets is not superior to that of the stock market.' This paper sets out to re-examine the question of whether abnormal returns can be earned from a strategy of investing in firms predicted by a statistical model to be potential takeover targets. Palepu's (1986) paper is used as a useful starting point. This paper then extends Palepu's work in three important areas. First, a multinomial logit model is employed to estimate separately the probability that a firm will be subject to either a hostile or a friendly takeover. Palepu, like most previous studies, employed a simple binomial logit model in which takeover targets are treated as one homogenous group (i.e., takeover targets).
Research has shown, however, that modeling takeovers using a binomial framework may be misleading since takeovers may occur for many reasons. For example, Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, (1988) note that separate considerations are appropriate for predicting which firms are subject to hostile (disciplinary) and friendly (synergistic) takeovers. Given this, it is likely that in a simple binomial setting in which target firms are treated as one homogenous group, much information may be lost. Using a multinomial framework, firms are classified not only according to whether or not the event took place, but also on the characteristics of the event (i.e., hostile or friendly). This should lead to a better model in terms of significance and explanatory power, which in turn, should help improve predictive ability.
Second, in selecting firms to include in his portfolio, Palepu applied a decision rule which resulted in his portfolio comprising a large number of non-target firms incorrectly predicted as targets; of the 625 firms in his portfolio, only 24 were in fact targets. Investing in such a large portfolio is unlikely to yield abnormal returns since the abnormal returns to the small number of actual targets in the portfolio are diluted by the near zero abnormal returns to the large number of firms not taken over. The large proportion of firms having expected returns near zero made the power of his test rather low. Given that Palepu included in his portfolio all firms with positive expected abnormal returns, no matter how small, it is not surprising for him to conclude that share prices reflect the takeover probabilities of his model.
If the objective of the prediction model is to earn abnormal returns, the optimal classification rule or portfolio selection criterion should be to maximise the proportion of target firms in the portfolio. This is achieved by examining the concentration of target firms within portfolios constructed from the estimation sample of target and non-target firms. Ten portfolios are constructed by sorting each firm in the estimation sample in descending order by its probability of takeover. The classification rule is derived from the portfolio that has the highest concentration of target firms. Applying this rule results in smaller portfolios with higher average takeover probabilities. Hence, if share prices do not reflect takeover probabilities, it is more likely to show up in the results. Otherwise, results comparable to Palepu's should be found.
Finally, this paper conducts a more rigorous analysis of the portfolio abnormal returns. First, portfolio abnormal returns are computed over a longer time horizon of up to 36-months. Second, as recommended by Barber and Lyon, (1997) and Kothari and Warner, (1997) , buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed as opposed to cumulative abnormal returns. Third, abnormal returns are calculated using a control portfolio approach (where the expected return on a firm is the equally weighted return on a control portfolio matched by firm size). Both Barber and Lyon, (1997) and Kothari and Warner, (1997) recommend the control portfolio approach which, they show, produces well specified test statistics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the statistical models employed in estimating the probability of takeover for a firm. Section 3 describes the sample construction and data employed. Section 4 outlines the procedures followed in constructing the portfolios. The performance of the portfolios is reported in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes with a discussion and summary of the main points of the paper. Palepu (1986) , like most previous studies, employed a binomial logit model to estimate the probability of takeover for a firm. The use of a binomial model may, however, result in biased takeover probabilities since it treats target firms as belonging to one homogenous group (i.e., targets). Research has shown that modeling takeovers as one homogenous group may be misleading since takeovers may occur for many reasons. For example, Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, (1988) note that separate considerations are appropriate for predicting which firms are subject to hostile (disciplinary) and friendly (synergistic) takeovers. Similarly, in the UK, Powell (1997) shows that treating hostile and friendly takeovers as the same may result in a mis-specified model. Given this, it is likely that in a simple binomial setting in which target firms are treated as one homogenous group, much information may be lost. Classifying firms not only according to whether or not the event took place, but also on the characteristics of the event (i.e., hostile or friendly), should improve both the explanatory power and the significance of the model, which in turn, should help improve predictive ability.
Takeover likelihood models
To address this issue, this paper employs a multinomial logit model to estimate separately the probability that each firm in the population will be subject to a hostile or a friendly takeover. 4 The multinomial logit model specifies the probability, P ij , that firm i will belong to outcome j (e.g., be a non-target if j = 0, a hostile target if j = 1 or friendly target if j = 2) as a function of some vector of measured characteristics, X i , of the firm i. The model specified is as follows (Maddala, 1983) :
where β j is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In order to identify the parameters of the model, the normalization β 0 = 0 is imposed. The parameters of the model are estimated using maximum likelihood within LIMDEP (Greene, 1991) . The estimation procedure yields two sets of parameters; the first set representing hostile targets relative to non-targets and the second representing friendly targets relative to non-targets. The probability that a firm will be either a hostile or a friendly target can then be evaluated. A binomial model in which hostile and friendly targets are treated as belonging to one homogenous group is also estimated for comparison purposes.
Four logit models are estimated. The four models first can be distinguished by whether they aggregate targets into a single group or treat hostile and friendly targets as separate. The models which treat targets as a single group (i.e., binomial) are denoted B1 and B2 and the models which separate hostile and friendly takeovers into separate groups (i.e., Since financial ratios are likely to vary both over time (e.g., through changes in price levels, accounting policies, and the business cycle) and across industries, rescaling the variables should go some way to improving stability. A good prediction model is one that remains stable both over time and across all industries. Barnes (1990) and Platt and Platt (1990) recommend the use of industry-relative ratios in prediction studies to help alleviate the data instability problem.
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The variables employed in estimating the models represent six takeover theories.
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These theories are chosen because they have been frequently and consistently documented in the literature as explanations for takeovers (see, e.g., Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) .
The theories include the replacement of inefficient management, firm under valuation, free cash flow, firm size, real property and growth-resource imbalance. The takeover theories and the variables used to proxy them are briefly summarized below.
Replacement of inefficient management
This takeover motive argues that takeovers are a mechanism by which managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value are replaced by more efficient managers. Here, the threat of takeover provides a useful mechanism for encouraging managers to pursue shareholder wealth maximization strategies. Firms with inefficient managers are likely to suffer from poor performance. Several studies have shown poor performance as measured by share price and accounting rates of return to be a characteristic of target firms (e.g., Asquith, 1983; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996) .
In this paper, the accounting return on capital employed (ROCE) is used to proxy managerial performance. The ROCE is computed and averaged over a period of two years prior to the observation year. The observation year is defined for a target firm as the year in which it is taken over, and for a non-target firm, the year in which it is observed not to be taken over.
Firm under valuation
Firms who possess a low market-to-book (MTB) ratio are likely to be targets. Under this scenario, a low MTB ratio signals undervalued or under-utilized assets. By seeking out firms with low MTB ratio's an acquiring firm captures 'cheap' assets. The appropriate measure to use for this purpose is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets, a ratio usually known as 'Tobin's q'. The lower q is, the higher the likelihood of a potential acquirer preferring to acquire the firm rather than start afresh (Hasbrouck, 1985) .
In this paper, the MTB ratio is used as a proxy for q because replacement costs were not consistently produced by UK firms during the period covered by the study. The MTB ratio is calculated as at the accounting year-end prior to the observation year.
Free cash flow
Free cash flow (FCF) is 'cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the relevant cost of capital' (Jensen, 1986, p. 321 ). The theory predicts that firms with incompetent management teams that have performed poorly and firms that have done exceptionally well and have accumulated large FCFs that are not returned to investors are the most likely targets. This theory has received empirical support from Palepu (1986) and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) The ratio of operating cash flow to total assets is used to proxy FCF. The ratio is computed and averaged over a period of two years prior to the observation year.
Firm size
This theory suggests that takeover likelihood decreases with firm size. The theory is based on the premise that there are transaction costs of takeovers related to size making it more difficult for potential bidders to absorb large firms. The firm size theory of takeovers has probably received the most consistent support in the takeover literature (e.g., Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Palepu, 1986; and Ambrose and Megginson, 1992) .
The log of total assets (SIZE), as a measure of the size of the firm, is included in the models. Size is measured as at the year-end prior to the observation year.
Real property
Firms with a high percentage of tangible fixed assets in their total asset structure are thought likely takeover targets. One explanation for this effect is that tangible fixed assets could be a proxy for greater debt-capacity (Stulz and Johnson, 1985) . A bidding firm could use the target's own assets as security for debt financing of the takeover, thereby effectively lowering the direct cost to the acquiring firm. Furthermore, firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets make ideal candidates for asset striping by 'raiders' (Eddey, 1991) .
The ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets (TNG) is computed and averaged over a period of two years prior to the observation year.
Growth-resource imbalance
Growth, liquidity and leverage variables are also included in the estimated models.
These variables have been used by several studies, (e.g., Palepu, 1986; and Ambrose and Megginson, 1992 ) and appear to be potentially important variables in determining the likelihood of takeover. One motive for takeover may be the existence of a growth-resource imbalance in the target. For example, high growth firms with low resources (i.e., low liquidity and high leverage) may be targeted by acquiring firms with the opposite growth-resource imbalance (i.e., low growth, resource rich). Also, low growth firms with high resources may be targeted by acquiring firms with the opposite growth-resource imbalance (i.e., high growth, resource poor) so as to take advantage of the excess cash flows of the target. By acquiring a firm with the opposite growth-resource imbalance, the value of the combined firms should exceed the value of the two firms separately.
Growth (GRO) is measured as average sales growth over the period of two years prior to the observation year. Liquidity (LIQ) is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets, and leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of debt to the total share capital and reserves. Both these latter variables are averaged over two years prior to the observation year.
_________________
Insert Table 1 Here
The firm characteristics employed as variables in the takeover models are summarized in Table 1 .
Sample construction
The estimation sample comprises a pooled sample of targets and non-targets drawn from the 'true' population of firms for the period 1986 to 1995. The 'true' population of firms is re-constructed for each year from the Official list, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) list and the 'dead' companies list. A total of 471 targets meet all data requirements and are included in the estimation sample (see Table 2 below). The targets are partitioned according to whether the takeover was hostile or friendly. A hostile target is defined as one were the target management reject the initial bid from the acquiring firm, otherwise the takeover is defined as friendly.
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Of the 471 targets, 81 are defined as hostile and 390 as friendly.
_______________
Insert Table 2 Here
_________________
The non-target firms are selected randomly from the re-constructed population of firms for each year between 1986 and 1995. The number of non-targets selected from each year equals the number of target firms for that year. This gives a total estimation sample of 942 firms (471 targets and 471 non-targets). Of the 942 firms, 76 (27 targets and 49 nontargets) are identified as outliers.
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The final estimation sample totals 866 firms.
Notice that the sample resembles a choice-based sample in that all possible targets are included compared to only a random selection of non-targets. Such a sample is not representative of the true population and would result in biased parameter estimates when employed in model estimation. Cosslett (1981) and Maddala (1983) , however, show that the bias introduced by a choice-based sampling scheme for the logit model is limited to the parameter estimate on the constant term only, which will be biased upwards. The constant term can be easily adjusted to account for the nature of the choice-based sampling scheme.
This adjustment simply amounts to a scaling down of the estimated takeover probabilities.
However, as Barnes (1990) points out, the bias in the constant term only affects the precise takeover probabilities assigned to a firm given its attributes. It does not, however, affect the ranking of firms in terms of their estimated takeover probabilities. In this paper, we are only concerned with the ranking of firms in terms of their estimated takeover probabilities hence no adjustment is necessary.
Portfolio construction
This section describes the procedures followed in arriving at an optimal cut-off probability for each of the models. The within sample discrimination ability of the models is then reported followed by a comparison of the models significance and explanatory power.
The out-of-sample predictive ability of the models on the true population of firms is then reported.
Optimal cut-off probabilities and within sample discrimination ability
The selection of firms for inclusion in a portfolio is usually made on the basis of some classification rule.
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In Palepu (1986) , the classification rule was derived by minimizing the total number of misclassifications. The calculation of an optimum classification rule (or cutoff probability) amounts to a trade-off between the marginal cost of committing a Type I error (a target incorrectly classified as a non-target) or a Type II error (a non-target incorrectly classified as a target). Palepu assumed, like most previous studies, that the costs of Type I and Type II errors are equal and constant.
This assumption is, however, unrealistic since the gains to target firms prior to takeover far exceed those to firms not taken over (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) . The penalty for the misclassification of a non-target firm would thus be significantly smaller than the pay-off from the correct classification of a target. Hence, if the objective is to maximize the abnormal returns of a portfolio, then the costs are neither equal nor constant.
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Such a rule would result in a low cut-off probability since equal weight is applied to both Type I and Type II errors. By applying a low cut-off probability, Palepu increased the number of non-target firms incorrectly classified as targets (Type II error) in his portfolio. For example, Palepu's portfolio comprised of 625 firms, of which only 24 were in fact targets. By including many firms only slightly more likely to be taken over than a randomly selected firm, Palepu put much weight on firms where the expected abnormal return was close to zero. In this case, any significant abnormal returns to the small number of actual target firms in the portfolio would be diluted by the near zero abnormal returns of the large number of firms not taken over.
Hence, it is not surprising that he found that he could not earn abnormal returns by investing in firms predicted by his model to be takeover targets. As such, the power of Palepu's test of whether prices reflect future takeover probabilities is rather low.
If the objective of the estimated model is to earn abnormal returns, then the optimal portfolio selection criterion should be to maximize the proportion of target firms in the selected portfolio rather than minimizing the absolute number of misclassifications, as is typically done in prediction studies. In this paper, the takeover probabilities from the logit models are used to construct ten portfolios (i.e., deciles) sorted in descending order of takeover probability. The portfolios are then examined for differences in target concentration. The selected cut-off is then the first takeover probability in that portfolio which has the highest concentration ratio (ratio of number of targets to the total number of firms in the portfolio). This rule results in a higher cut-off probability, which in turn results in smaller portfolios with higher average takeover probabilities. Hence, if share prices do not reflect takeover probabilities, it is more likely to show up in the results. If share prices do reflect takeover probabilities, results comparable to Palepu's should be found. Table 5 in Appendix A shows the target concentration ratios (C-ratio) and the corresponding cut-offs for portfolios formed on the basis of computed takeover probabilities for each model. Table 5 also reports the within sample discrimination ability for each cut-off.
Naturally, a priori, only one model and cut-off (the optimal cut-off) can be chosen to predict future targets for portfolio selection. The optimal cut-off is denoted in each table by boldtype.
One observation that can be made from The within sample discrimination also seems to be quite high, particularly for hostile targets. With the optimal cut-off, the models are able to classify, on average, 85 percent of hostile and non-target firms correctly. For the friendly models, the comparative results are 61 percent, which is substantially lower than the hostile models. Again, however, this result is not surprising since hostile targets seem to be more easily distinguishable from the general population. The within sample discrimination ability of the models is, however, of little interest since it tells us little about the actual predictive ability of the models. Also, the model parameters and cut-off probabilities are obtained from the estimation sample. Hence, any test based on this sample is likely to be biased. Second, modelling takeovers in a multinomial framework greatly improves the models overall significance and explanatory power. In terms of model selection, we should therefore expect a priori, model 2 (binomial and multinomial) to outperform model 1 in terms of prediction and the ability to generate superior portfolios.
Predictive ability of the models
In this paper, portfolios of predicted targets are formed on 1 January 1996. The population of firms at this date is therefore used to test the true predictive ability of the models.
14 After meeting the criteria for inclusion in the study, 1000 firms have the required data, 29 (4 hostile and 25 friendly) of which were actually acquired by the end of December, 1996. The estimated parameters from each of the estimated logit models are used to compute the takeover probability for each firm in the population. Portfolios are formed by applying the optimal cutoff probabilities reported in Table 5 in Appendix A. For comparison purposes, portfolios are also formed for the binomial models using Palepu's rule of minimizing the total error rate. The predictive performance of the models is reported in Table 3 .
_________________
Insert Table 3 Here _________________ Measuring predictive ability as the percentage of total correct predictions and choosing the optimal cut-off as that which maximises the proportion of targets (i.e., the Cratio), Table 3 shows that the binomial models predict quite well, on average predicting about 84 percent of targets and non-targets correctly. As anticipated, model B2 clearly outperforms model B1 in terms of predictive ability. These results compare quite favourably with Palepu (1986) whose best model correctly predicts only 46 percent of firms in the population. It is interesting to note that if, a priori, the cut-off had been chosen as that which maximised the total number of correct classifications (i.e., as in Palepu 1986), the resulting predictive accuracy would have been much lower, on average about 47 percent and hence, similar to Palepu. Surprisingly, for the multinomial logit models, the overall percentage of total correct predictions (where the optimal cut-off is selected using the C-ratio) is marginally lower, on average predicting about 81 percent of hostile (friendly) and non-target firms correctly.
In the context of this paper, the true test is whether the models are able to clearly identify target firms from the total population. If the models can clearly identify target firms from the total population then we should be able to earn significant abnormal returns from the investment strategy of investing in all firms predicted by the models to be future takeover targets. It is clear from Table 3 that the models fail to clearly identify target firms from the total population. For example, of the 96 firms predicted as targets in model B2, only 2 are in fact targets (2%). On a random basis alone, 2.9 percent (29 acquired / 1000 total population) of firms have the potential to be acquired implying that model B2 is no better than a random selection. The multinomial logit models perform significantly worse. For example, model M2 predicts 387 firms to be hostile (friendly) targets when in fact only 8 (1 hostile and 7 friendly) or 2 percent are actually acquired by 31 December, 1996. Since the models fail to clearly identify target firms in the population, it is unlikely that the resulting portfolios will produce significant abnormal returns. The abnormal returns to the small number of target firms in each portfolio would be diluted by the zero abnormal returns to the non-target firms incorrectly predicted as targets -a result similar to Palepu. This issue is discussed next.
Portfolio abnormal returns
This section describes the procedures followed in calculating abnormal returns to the predicted portfolios. Monthly logarithmic returns for each firm in each portfolio are calculated using Datastream's returns index (data-type RI). The returns index is calculated on the assumption that gross dividends are re-invested at the ex-dividend date, so ignores tax and reinvestment charges. Log returns are used since it is argued that empirically they are more likely to be normally distributed, and hence, conform to the assumptions of standard statistical techniques (Strong, 1992) . Furthermore, more recent studies (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997) argue that for detecting long-horizon abnormal stock returns, the SAM alleviates biases present in other models.
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With this approach, the predicted abnormal return (AR) for security j in month t is given as
where R pt is the equally weighted mean return on a portfolio of shares in the same size decile as firm j in month t. Size-matched control portfolios are constructed by ranking all firms on the LSE by their equity market values at 1 January 1996 and allocating them to ten portfolios based on market capitalization. 1157 firms were identified, resulting in 9 portfolios of 115 firms and 1 portfolio with 122 firms. The equally weighted mean return for each portfolio was calculated and used as the appropriate control return.
The predicted portfolios are formed on 1 January 1996 and held for 12, 24 and 36 month holding periods. Following Kothari and Warner (1997) , abnormal performance is defined as the cross-sectional average of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BAHAR). Naturally, not all firms survive the entire 36-month holding period, due to takeover or bankruptcy. For these firms, abnormal performance is measured over the months they survived. The BAHAR for a portfolio of N firms is 
where the cross-sectional standard deviation of the mean abnormal returns is
If each firm's BAHAR is independent and identically distributed, then the test statistic should be approximately unit normal (Kothari and Warner, 1997) .
In his portfolio of predicted targets, Palepu (1986) found that he could not earn significant abnormal returns. However, even if we assume that the results from Palepu's model were not incorporated into prices, one would expect his results since he included in his portfolio all firms with positive expected abnormal returns, no matter how small. Following a similar procedure to Palepu, that is, choosing the appropriate cut-off as that which minimizes the total error rate (i.e., the cut-off that maximizes the total number of correct predictions), Table 3 shows that model B1 (% Correct = 58.31) predicts 410 firms to be targets, of which only 13 are in fact targets by the end of the 12-month holding period. Since the portfolios in this paper are formed using higher cut-offs, smaller portfolios having higher average probabilities result. Therefore, if prices do not reflect takeover probabilities, it is more likely to be discovered, otherwise, results similar to Palepu's should be found. Table 4 Here _________________ Table 4 reports the BAHAR for each of the estimated models for holding periods of 12, 24 and 36-months. The results for the SAM indicate that on average, the models earn abnormal returns insignificantly different from zero. This result is not surprising given inability of the models to clearly identify target firms (hostile or friendly) from the population of firms (see Table 3 ).
_________________ Insert
Comparing portfolio strategies, the strategy developed in this paper performs no better than Palepu's. In fact, comparing the binomial models (B1 and B2), the portfolio abnormal returns are actually more negative across all holding-periods using the concentration ratio (C-ratio) as the classification rule (see Panel C in Table 4 ). One explanation for this result is that the smaller portfolios created using the classification rule in this paper contain a higher proportion of failed or financially distressed firms. Since the portfolios created using Palepu's classification rule are significantly larger, the impact of any distressed firms on portfolio performance is greatly reduced.
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The portfolio performance of the multinomial models suggests that they are no better than the binomial models. Comparing the hostile and friendly portfolios, there is some weak evidence to suggest that predicting hostile takeovers only might be a possible strategy.
However, the differences in the portfolio abnormal returns are not statistically significant.
Summary and conclusions
Several previous papers have examined the possibility of generating abnormal returns through a strategy of investing in firms predicted by a statistical model to be potential takeover targets. Such a strategy is attractive since the market appears to have difficulty in clearly identifying future takeover targets even four to six months prior to takeover (Jensen and Ruback, 1983 ). Implementing such a strategy, Palepu (1986) found that abnormal returns could not be earned by investing in takeover targets. However, even if prices did not reflect takeover probabilities, Palepu's result would be expected since he included in his portfolio all firms with expected abnormal returns, no matter how small. As such, the large proportion of firms having expected returns near zero made the power of his test rather low.
Implementing a more powerful test, including some experimentation with models using a multinomial framework, the results of this paper also suggest that developing statistical models to predict takeover targets is unlikely to result in a profitable investment strategy. Nonetheless, the strategy followed in this paper provides for a stronger test of whether prices reflect future takeover probabilities. Future research needs to concentrate on developing models that have significantly higher explanatory power than the models employed in this paper. One avenue for future research, which may lead to improved explanatory power in the models, would be to incorporate board and ownership-type variables. Several studies indicate that these variables play a significant role in determining not only the likelihood of takeover, but also the nature of the bid (see, e.g., Morck, et al. 1988; .
Footnotes

1
In this paper, the term target refers to successful takeover targets.
2 Primarily, we are only interested in a 12-month investment strategy. However, it is possible that a 12-month prediction horizon may underestimate the possibility of generating abnormal returns. For example, firms predicted as takeover targets may not actually be subject to successful takeover until some period after one year.
Expanding the portfolio holding period to 24 and 36 months should account for this possibility. (Maddala, 1983) . In order to avoid the survivorship bias problem common to Datastream industry averages, the true population of firms for each year was re-constructed and used to calculate the appropriate value weighted industry and economy averages for each of the variables used in the study.
6
Addressing the stability problem is of particular importance in this study due to the pooled estimation sample over a ten-year period . It is highly unlikely that financial ratios remain stable over this time period, so the use of industry-relative ratios should in some way help address this problem.
7
The approach typically used to date in selecting variables for prediction models is to select on an ad hoc basis a large number of variables and examine their usefulness in the model through some filtering mechanism such as factor analysis or stepwise refinement (e.g., Barnes, 1990) . Palepu (1986, p.16 Three year of data is required since it is the minimum number of years necessary to compute the average sales growth ratio. This definition may result in misclassification errors in classifying hostile and friendly takeovers. For example, target management may reject an initial bid in an attempt to encourage the acquiring firm to bid up the price. In this case bids that appear hostile may, in fact, be friendly. In the same light, some friendly takeovers may in fact be hostile simply because target management may feel it futile to oppose the bid since it perceives its success as inevitable (e.g., the bidder may be much larger in terms of physical size, have a highly skilled management and advisory team, and have a reputation for winning bids). One way to minimize this bias is to examine the departure rates of directors post-takeover. If key top managers are removed, it is more likely the takeover is hostile. Note, however, that this data may not be publicly available at the time of operationalizing the prediction model.
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Outliers are defined as those observations that lie ±3 standard deviations from the mean for a given variable. Although several techniques are available for dealing with outliers (e.g., winsorizing or trimming to mean values), their simple removal is seen as optimal given the relatively large estimation sample.
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In applying the classification rule, the estimated probability assigned to a firm is compared to the cut-off probability. If the estimated takeover probability exceeds the cut-off, the firm is classified as a target; otherwise it is classified as a non-target. For hostile takeovers, if a firm's takeover probability is greater than the cut-off, the firm is classified as a hostile target; otherwise the firm is classified as a non-target. Since we are predicting the probability of a hostile takeover, the non-target sample will include friendly takeovers. The same procedure is applied when predicting the probability of a friendly takeover for a firm. Here, the non-target sample will include hostile takeovers. Hence, this classification scheme is binomial in a sense. Such a scheme seems reasonable since it may be more beneficial to predict one type of takeover, particularly if one type of takeover is more easily identifiable (predictable) from the total population (refer to Table 5 in the Appendix for the differences in the distribution of hostile and friendly targets). Furthermore, the literature has shown that the gains to hostile targets are greater than those to friendly targets, in some cases by as much as 10 percent (Franks and Mayer, 1996) . Hence, in a portfolio setting, one would want to include as many hostile targets as possible. Predicting hostile and friendly targets separately directly addresses these issues.
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For example, assume that one firm has been placed in a portfolio that is equally weighted. Let this firm actually become a target and earn the average abnormal return for targets, r. If the next firm placed in the portfolio is not acquired (a Type II error), it earns zero abnormal returns. Now, the portfolio abnormal return is r/2, resulting in an incremental loss of r/2. If the third firm is also a Type II error, this will reduce the portfolio abnormal return to r/3, which is an incremental loss of only r/6. Clearly the loss on misclassification is not constant. Furthermore, if we assume instead that after the first firm, a correctly predicted target is placed in the portfolio, there is a Type I error excluded that earns r. The cost of this error is r, compared to r/2 for the Type II error, so the losses are not equal either. 
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The high proportion of distressed firms is not surprising, since takeover targets and firms experiencing financial distress often share common characteristics, for example, poor prior performance and smaller firm size. This has lead to some support for a bankruptcy avoidance hypothesis, where a firm in financial distress would rather be taken over than face bankruptcy (see, e.g., Amit, Joshua and Zarowin, 1988) . 5.58%
Appendix A
The table shows the concentration ratios and classification ability of each model. The concentration ratio (Cratio) is the ratio of the number of targets to the total number of firms in each decile (denoted by bold-type). The cut-off refers to the cut-off probability achieved at each decile. A type I error occurs when a target is misclassified as a non-target and a type II error occurs when a non-target is misclassified as a target. The percentage of total correct classifications (% total correct) refers to the percentage of target and non-target firms correctly classified by the model. The percentage of targets in the portfolio (% targets in portfolio) is calculated as the number of targets firms correctly classified by the model divided by the total number of firms in the portfolio. The likelihood ratio, given by 2*(log likelihood at convergence -log likelihood with constant term only), is used to test the null hypothesis that all the parameters in a model are simultaneously equal to zero. The statistic is distributed χ 2 with degrees of freedom equaling the number of parameters in the model. The McFadden R 2 calculated as 1-(log likelihood at convergence / log likelihood with constant term only), provides a measure of the explanatory power of the logit model and is similar to the R 2 value in OLS regression. This table reports the variables definitions used to proxy the selected takeover theories. The variables used to proxy the inefficient management, the real property and the free cash flow theories are computed and averaged over a period of two years prior to the observation year. The observation year is defined for a target as the year in which it is taken over (i.e., the date at which the acquirer gains control, otherwise know as the unconditional date), and for a non-target firm, as the year it was observed not to be taken over. The variables used to proxy the firm size and firm under valuation theories are measured as at the year-end prior to the observation year. Growth, liquidity and leverage are included to capture the growth-resource-imbalance theory. Growth is measured as average sales growth over the period of two years prior to the observation year and liquidity and leverage are averaged over two years prior to the observation year. This table shows the predictive ability of the models using the total population of firms as at 1 January 1996. The concentration ratio (C-ratio) is the ratio of the number of targets to the total number of firms in each decile (denoted by bold-type). The percentage of correct classifications (% correct) refers to the percentage of target and non-target firms correctly classified by the estimation model (see Table 3 ). The cut-off refers to the cut-off probability achieved at each decile. A type I error occurs when a target is incorrectly predicted as a non-target and a type II error occurs when a non-target is incorrectly predicted as a target. The portfolio size refers to the sum of the number of targets predicted correctly plus the number of non-targets incorrectly predicted as targets (i.e., type II error). The percentage of total correct predictions (% total correct) refers to the number of targets and non-targets correctly predicted for a given cut-off probability. The percentage of targets correctly predicted (% targets) is calculated as the number of targets predicted for a given cut-off divided by the total number of firms taken over by 31 January 1996. The percentage of non-targets correctly predicted (%Non-Targets) is calculated as the number of non-targets predicted for a given cut-off divided by the total number of firms not taken over by 31 December 1996. The percentage of targets in the portfolio (% targets in portfolio) is calculated as the number of targets firms correctly predicted for a given cut-off divided by the total number of firms in the portfolio. This table reports the abnormal returns to the constructed portfolios. C-ratio refers to portfolios created using a cut-off probability derived on the basis of the concentration ratio (i.e., maximizing the proportion of target firms in the portfolio). % correct refers to portfolios created using a cut-off probability derived on the basis of the percentage of total correct classifications. Note that this strategy is similar to the one adopted by Palepu (1986) . The combined portfolio includes both hostile and friendly targets predicted using the C-Ratio as the optimal cutoff probability. The combined portfolio includes one firm predicted as both a hostile and a friendly target hence, the number of firms in the portfolio is reduced from 387 to 386. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1% level, 2 tail test ** Significant at the 5% level, 2 tail test.
